The Attack on Fort Johnson, July 2, 1864

Summary - On July 2, 1864 the Federal Army launched an amphibious attack against Ft. Johnson, on James Island. After some initial success, the attack, which fell on a smaller Confederate Defense Force, failed. This attack opened a week's fighting around Charleston with every assault ending in a Confederate victory though each conflict drained Charleston's diminished Confederate Garrison, now competing with the mounting conflicts in Georgia and Virginia for desperately needed troops. Three reports are included.

1. The Federal Judge Advocate's Report
2. Federal Col. Hoyt Reports from Charleston Jail
3. Confederate General Jones reports Charleston held

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE SOUTH,
October 26, 1864.

Report of the attack on Forts Johnson and Simkins, James Island, S.C., on the night of July 2, 1864:

On the evening of July 2, 1864, the Fifty-second Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry, Colonel Hoyt, and the One hundred and twenty-seventh New York Volunteer Infantry, Major Little, were sent on an expedition from Morris Island to James Island. Three detachments of 20 men each from the Third Rhode Island Volunteer Artillery accompanied them, two attached to the Fifty-second Pennsylvania and one to the One hundred and twenty-seventh New York. The men embarked immediately after dark and proceeded to Paine's Dock. The low stage of the tide caused the boats to run aground, producing some delay. The boats started from Paine's Dock in single file, the Fifty-second Pennsylvania leading. They were to cross the harbor till opposite the beach between Simkins and Johnson; then each boat's crew was to turn to the left, pull vigorously to land, and assault with the bayonet, the Fifty-second Pennsylvania attacking Fort Johnson, the One hundred and twenty-seventh New York Fort Simkins. Clear and precise instructions were given to all concerned. The only signal of retreat was to be sounded on a bugle in possession of Colonel Hoyt.

The time of leaving Paine's Dock was about 2 a.m. Some of the boats were pontoons, some metallic boats; a few leaked, but the great majority were in good condition, and the failure cannot be attributed to any defect in the means of transportation. Perhaps as much cannot be said for the skill of the boatmen. If the boats had been steered and rowed by seamen, much of the grounding and fouling which delayed the progress of the expedition and furnished an excuse to the faint-hearted for not pushing vigorously on might have been avoided. The pilot, Sergeant Bennett, One hundred and twenty-seventh New York, failed to find the passage through the bar near Fort Johnson; he seems to have lost his lead. Colonel Hoyt declares himself unable to decide whether this man was merely ignorant or was guilty of willful misconduct. Colonel Hoyt and Lieutenant-Colonel Conyngham, Fifty-second Pennsylvania, by their personal exertion, succeeded in finding a narrow channel through the bar and close to the shore. They passed through, but it was now about daybreak, and the enemy, discovering them, opened a heavy fire, which, however, was almost entirely harmless, passing far overhead.

The boats commanded by Colonel Hoyt, Lieutenant-Colonel Conyngham, Captain Camp, Lieutenant Stevens, and Lieutenant Evans, all of the Fifty-second Pennsylvania, rowed rapidly to the shore, and these officers, with Adjutant Bunyan (afterward killed) and 135 men, landed, took a water battery, and pushed toward Fort Johnson. This work they were not able to carry, and, being deserted by their comrades, were obliged to surrender to a force of the enemy estimated by Colonel Hoyt at 150 when the attack commenced and 300 at the time of his surrender.

Colonel Hoyt bestows unqualified praise on the officers and men who landed with him, of whom 7 were killed and 16 wounded. Colonel Hoyt himself deserves great credit for his energy in hurrying on the boats, and bringing them through a narrow passage in the bar when the pilot had failed. <ar65_41>

It might have been better, as shown by results, if Colonel Hoyt had remained in immediate command of the second division of his regiment, which he at starting took under his charge, and in which and in the third division the retreat commenced; he might have stopped the confusion and retreat; but his error, if any, in landing at the head of his regiment was certainly a pardonable one, and a natural consequence of his inherent gallantry.

At the time of Colonel Hoyt's landing great confusion existed in the second and third divisions of the Fifty-second Pennsylvania Regiment (each regiment had three divisions), and a retreat commenced. It is impossible to discover which boats first led off the disgraceful movement. The occupants of each declare that they saw others retreating before they themselves turned; the second and third divisions of the Fifty-second Pennsylvania falling back in confusion. The One hundred and twenty-seventh New York shared the general movement, and retreated also. The whole expedition returned to Morris Island.

Colonel Gurney, One hundred and twenty-seventh New York, commanding post of Morris Island, who was charged with sending the expedition, did not accompany it, but remained at Paine's Dock. There seems no sufficient reason for this conduct. The expedition was a highly important one, comprising a considerable part of the force on Morris Island, and there was no danger of any attack on the island during its absence. The presence of a commanding officer when the landing was effected would undoubtedly have been of great service in preventing the retreat. Colonel Gurney certainly committed at least a great error of judgment.

The chief cause of failure was the want of dash, energy, and authority oh the part of the subordinate officers. In an expedition of this kind, the officers commanding boats must exercise in great measure an independent authority, while at the same time they have the men entirely under their control. It is upon them that the main responsibility must rest, and the evidence shows that many of them were totally unequal to this occasion. Among those who seem to have been most wanting in decision and power of command were Major Jayne, Captain Weed, and Lieutenants Farr, Moses, and Hollingsworth, of the Fifty-second Pennsylvania, and the confusion in the boats could only have arisen from a very lax state of discipline in this regiment.

The One hundred and twenty-seventh New York Regiment is less culpable than the Fifty-second Pennsylvania, inasmuch as they followed instead of leading in the retreat, and they showed more coolness and discipline; still they are gravely in fault for not obeying the peremptory orders of their commanding officer, Major Little (who seems to have done everything in his power), to land. From this censure must be excepted Captain Henry, Captain Little, and Lieutenants Little and Abercrombie, who brought their boats to the shore and landed. Captain Weston, too, deserves favorable mention. The officers and men of the Third Rhode Island Artillery behaved well.

The expedition was well planned, and notwithstanding hinderances and delays would have succeeded had it not been for the absence of the commanding officer and the want of spirit and energy on the part of many of his subordinates.

JOHN C. GRAY, JR.,

Major and Judge-Advocate.

Federal Col. Hoyt Reports from Charleston Jail

CHARLESTON JAIL, August 2, 1864.

On 3d July we carried Fort Simkins, the Brooke gun battery, and with 135 men (all who had landed) pushed over the parapets of Fort Johnson, and the garrison had actually begun to leave. The battery (Tynes) was in our possession. Nothing but the failure of the other boats to land prevented our capture of the works. All who landed (five boat-loads, 135) were captured. I trust the most thorough investigation will be made, let the responsibility fall where it may.

HENRY M. HOYT,

Colonel Fifty-second Pennsylvania Volunteers

Confederate General Jones reports Charleston held

CHARLESTON, S.C., July 4, 1864.

On the morning of the 2d instant the enemy landed several regiments on south end of James Island, supported by two monitors and several gun-boats in the Stono, and after a sharp skirmish captured 2 field pieces and commenced intrenching. At the same time several gun-boats and transports with troops came up the North Edisto. At early dawn yesterday from 700 to 1,000 men in barges attacked Fort Johnson and were handsomely and thoroughly repulsed, with the loss to the enemy of 140 prisoners, with their arms and accouterments and 5 barges, and many killed and wounded. Our loss very slight. The enemy on south end of James Island fell back hastily yesterday before our men, leaving their dead unburied, and our picket-line is re-established, but the monitors and gun-boats are still in the Stono firing heavily on our lines, and another transport has just come up with troops. The party from North Edisto landed at White Point and advanced, but were met and driven back. So far the enemy has been repulsed at all points, with loss of about 600 men; but the position and movements of the enemy on James and John's Islands and adjacent river threaten most serious danger to this city. I am in extreme need of re-enforcements; have not yet any of the South Carolina reserves. My men are greatly exhausted and under the incessant fire of the monitors and gun-boats. Two-thirds of them will soon be unfit for duty. Some assistance should be speedily seat to me. Please lay this before the President.

SAM. JONES,

Major-General.